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SUMMARY:

tension)

~

The SG, on behalf of the NLRB, seeks

review of theCA 7's denial of enforcement of the Board's
bargaining order issued against resps.

The issue presented

by this interesting petition is whether application of the
National Labor Relations Act (Act) to schools operated by the
Roman Catholic Church, which teach both religious and secular
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subjects, violates the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment.

.,

2.

FACTS:

corporation

Resp The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, a

~ ~operates

Chicago, Quigley North and

two parochial secondary schools in
Quigl~y

South.

Prior to 1970 only

boys who had a positive desire to enter the priesthood were
admitted to these schools; since then, however, the admission
requirement has been that the boy must demonstrate some interest
in the priesthood or a potential for Christian leadership.

Ap-

proximately 16% of the schools' graduates actually go on to study
for the priesthood.

Resp Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc . ,

operates five parochial schools in northeastern Indiana.

These

schools have a lower "degree of religious orientation" than the
Quigley schools.
During September and October 1975 representation elections
It

\\

.

-

were held among the lay teachers at these schools; the Unions •.w.on
and were certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the two units.

1/

After the resps refused to

bargain with the Unions, complaints were issued against the
employers, alleging that their conduct violated§§ 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.

1/

Resps admitted their refusal to bargain but contended,

The Union certified
Education Association,
Association, while the
Community Alliance for

at the Quigley schools was the Quigley
an affiliate of the Illinois Education
Union at the Indiana schools was the
Teachers of Catholic High Schools.
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as they had in the earlier representation proceedings, that
the schools were "completely religious" and thus the Board should
decline to exercise jurisdiction over them under its discretionary
standard.

Through a series of cases, the Board has developed two

criteria for the exercise of its jurisdiction over private, religiously affiliated educational institutions:

it will not assert

jurisdiction over any nonprofit, private educational institution
that has gross annual revenues of less than $1 million, and it will
not assert jurisdiction over "institutions primarily religious and
noncommercial in character and purpose, whose educational endeavors
are limited essentially to furthering and nurturing their religious
beliefs."

Besides arguing that the schools fell within the latter

criterion, resps also contended that the First Amendment prohibite d
\ the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over them.
The Board concluded that resps had violated§§ S(a)(S) and
(1), rejecting the employers' jurisdictional arguments.

It held

that resps were not entitled to relitigate the determinations made
during the representation proceedings that the schools were not
completely religious.

As for the constitutional argument, the

Board rejected it, relying on its previous decision in Cardinal
Timothy Manning, Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of
Los Angeles, 223 NLRB 1218, which is currently pending in theCA 9.
There the Board held that the provisions of the Act do not interfere with religious beliefs and that the regulation of labor
relations does not violate the First Amendment 'when it involves a
minimal intrusion of · religious conduct and is necessary to obtain

- 4 that objective."

Resps were ordered to bargain collectively

with the Unions .

....
First the court examined the Board's distinction between schools
...,/ The CA 7 denied enforcement of the Board's order.

that are "completely religious" and those. that are merely religiously associated.

It found this dichotomy to provide no workable

guide for the exercise of the Board's discretion, for under it no
Roman Catholic secondary school could be characterized as completel:
religious.

Aft~r

examining this Court's cases involving aid to

parochial schools, theCA 7 stated that the Board's jurisdictional
rule had the effect of "cruelly whip-sawing [resps'] schools by
holding that institutions too religious to receive governmental
assistance are not religious enough to be excluded from its regulation."
Having rejected the Board's attempt to distinguish between
completely religious and religiously associated schools, the court
then considered the constitutional question.

It agreed with resps

that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over resps' schools
violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.

(The court referred to the Religion Clauses jointly

because of its belief that "there has been some blurring of sharply
honed differentiations" between them.)

TheCA 7's decision was

based on its view that the Board's order to bargain necessarily
inhibited the bishops' authority to maintain parochial schools in
accordance with ecclesiastical concern.

As an example, the court

said that a bishop might refuse to renew the contracts of all

~ay
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teachers because he believed the union had adopted policies

{ at odds with the religious character of the schools.

While

under ecclesiastical law the bishop would have the right to
I

take such action, he might be found guilty of an unfair labor
practice fe.r do.:_ng so.
The CA 7 distinguished permissible governmental
regulations which are applicable to parochial schools, such as
fire inspections, zoning laws, and compulsory attendance laws,
as having no clear inhibiting potential upon the relationship
between teachers and employers.

It also noted that such regu-

lations are applicable to all schools, whereas public schools are
expressly exempted from the Act.
Finally, the court considered the Board's contention
that, should an unfair labor charge be filed in a situation in
which the bishop asserted that an employee was dismissed for
reasons of religious

doctri~e,

the Board would try to make some

"reasonable accommodation" to the religious purpose of the school.
The court considered this attempt at accommodation to be unsatisfactory because it would involve "the necessity of explanation
and analysis, and probably verification and justification, of the
doctrinal precept involved, all of which would itself erode the
protective wall afforded by the constitutional right."
3.

CONTENTIONS:

--

The SG contends that the decision below

is based on an erroneous understanding of the Act and the Board's

c--

role in enforcing its provisions.

He says that if a church of-

ficial were to contend that an employee, allegedly discharged for

- 6 -

union activity, was in fact fired for espousing heretical
views, the Board's role would be limited to a determination
whether the employer's alleged reason for the discharge was
the actual one.

The Board's inquiry would end once it was

determined that the employee had not bee:.1 removed in an effort
to interfere with his § 7 rights.

The SG asserts that there

is no reason to believe that requiring the church official to
demonstrate that an employee was not discharged for a prohibited
reason would deter him from taking the action he thought necessary
with regard to that employee.

The prospect of impermissible

governmental entanglement with religious affairs is wholly conjectural at this point, he says.

Furthermore, even if it could be

shown that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over parochial
schools had the effect of regulating conduct based upon religious
convictions, the SG contends that it would be justified by the
compelling interest in preventing economic strife and the disruption of commerce.

Finally, the SG says that the petition should be

granted because the decision below could jeopardize labor relations
in the more than 10,000 parochial schools in the United States, in
many of which the collective bargaining process has been working
smoothly.
Resps contend that there is no reason for the Court to
review the decision below, for "the Seventh Circuit's application
of the governing law is unassailable."

They stress that this case

concerns only teachers and that no First Amendment objection is
raised here to the Board's possible assumption of

ju~isdiction

over

- 7 janitors or similar employees.

Like the court below, resps

contend that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over their
schools would necessarily involve government intrusion into
religious concerns.

They say that if the Board divines the

theological base3 for the bishop's action and reinforces his
authority in a labor dispute, it will run afoul of the
Establishment Clause; on the other hand, if it ignores the
theological concerns and resolves disputes strictly on industrial
standards, it will transgress the Free Exercise Clause.
4.

·niSCUSSION:

The issue presented is an important one,

which in my opinion should be given plenary consideration by the
Court.

The only reason I see for denying the present petition

is that currently pending in the CAs 3, 7, and 9 are similar cases
challenging the constitutionality of the Act's application to
religiously affiliated schools.

It might be helpful to have the

views of those circuits on the· question before ruling on it.

On

the other hand, this petition is presently before the Court, and it

-.......-----

clearly presents the constitutional issue; there is no assurance
..........
that those other cases will reach the Court
in a form suitable for

review.
There is a response.

1/31/78
ME

Gibson

Opinion in Petn.

UVCAI/ll

•,,,, •

•

•, •

•

• •,,,, •

•

r

•

Vt.t:;U

Utt., . . . . . , . . , , , . . , . • ,

li:J,,,

Argued .................. . , 19 .. .

Assigned ....... . .......... , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ............... . , 19 .. .

No.

77-752

NATL. LABOR RELATIONS BD.
vs.

-

~THOLIC

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

BISHOP OF CHICAGO

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMENT
N

POST

DIS

AFF

Burger, Ch. J . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. ~ . . . . ........... .
Brennan, J ..................... /

. . . . . ............. .. .

Stewart, J ..................... ·~ . . . . . .............. . .
White, J ......................./

... .... . . . ... .. ... . .

:~:~~~.J~::::::::::::::::::: ~~:::

:::::::::::::::::

Powell, J . ... .................................... .

:t:::~::s~

J

: :::: ::: :: ::::::

~

:::::: ::: ::

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

BENCH MEMORANDUM

No. 77-752

~~
:
{_G-) w~ ~

~---~J-Y!JA'

AIJI!1F~ /;:J~ .S ~ ~

tZ;_ ~~4 ~ ~ ~~ ~~ (lr) / k ~~ ~ L/1-,Jp ;:cess e;·
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO ~-· ~ ~(.;.... j1 ~)~
v

(Tiv-c~Pf~) ~~ ~~~

~~~~~~ .

NLRB

~ ~~~~-1- ~~-~~

~~~~1-r:J~
~~ .

Cert. to CA 7 (Cummings, Pell, and

Sprecher) ~

72..L,_~~

a.-L'.c:.( k

~ ~

·· -~~~~~
~~

-

UY~~

4rd:t.. ~;-y~~ .
~~~
b:z-~--~~

..

The central issue in this case is whether assertion of

a~~~~~~

NLRB jurisdiction over labor-management rera t ions between lay
~A..4. .....C..C.~'1' ~~~ 
teachers in parochial schools and the religious authorities in
7J.-<.... '~4'j~,,~ C/975

~{~.f. ~~bfA-

~frrr-~~~
~~~'-£--~~~

~~ ~#/'~)?J---~
H____

-

,__,~ .

•

~~

£¢.

2.

charge of the schools violates the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.

The case also presents the question whether the NLRB

violated statutory or constitutional constraints either in
formulating or in applying the self-imposed jurisdictional
standard under which it acted.
1.

Summary of the case:

Two cases involving

~

different groups of Catholic high schools were consolidated in
the CA 7.

-

In each case, an association of lay teachers in the

several schools within the group petitioned the NLRB for
certification as bargaining representative of the lay teachers.
The Bishops responsible for the schools (also referred to infra
as"the employers") opRosed certification on two grounds.
argued, first,

tha~nder

They

the NLRB's own jur,isdictional

standards,
,......_...,. the schools should be considered "completely
religious" and so not subject to NLRB jurisdiction. 1
The employer's second argument was

tha~sertion

of jurisdiction

by the NLRB would be a violation of the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses.
1.

In 1970 the NLRB began to assert jurisdiction over private

educational institutions.

But the NLRB declined to extend its

jurisdiction to private schools that it found to be "completely
religious,"
that is, devoted exclusively to teaching religion and
..._______.,.
religious subjects.

Where teaching was not limited to religious

subjects, however, the NLRB termed the schools "religiously
associated" and asserted jurisdiction.

,•

3.

The NLRB rejected both of these arguments and ordered
elections in the two units composed of the two groups of
schools.

In each election the union won and was certified by the

NLRB as the bargaining representative of the lay faculty.
The

~refused

bargaining orders.

to bargain, and the NLRB issued

On petitions to review the bargaining orders

-

and cross-petitions for enforcement, the CA 7 set aside the
orders and refused enforcement.

The CA 7 held that the NLRB's jurisdictional decision
was an abuse of discretion because the parochial. schools were
"completely religious" within any sensible meaning that could be
assigned to the terms of the NLRB's jurisdictional standard, and
that the NLRB's jurisdictional standard, as applied, therefore
drew arbitrary distinctions among religious educational
institutions.

Instead of denying enforcement on that ground

alone, and allowing the NLRB to consider whether an acceptable
alternative jurisdictional standard would entail assertion of
jurisdiction over the schools involved,

hemilV@!',

the CA 7

accepted the NLRB's representation that it would alter its
jurisdictional standard to assert jurisdiction over all religious
schools, including those involved in this case.

tA1 L~

consequently addressed the question of the

~,,.r~·
.he
~

£~

~r-

The CA 7

constituti~lity

of

NLRB's certification of the unions and its orders to

bargain.

It concluded that certification and collective

bargaining for lay teachers will result inevitably in NLRB
interference with religious faith and practice, and entanglement
-=
~
,-,_.,.....,~
-..
in church affgiLS, and that NLRB jurisdiction therefore would be
---

:we:

a violation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.

4.

2.

Arguments supporting affirmance.

The CA 7 opinion

contains two independent grounds for its refusal to grant
enforcement of the bargaining orders.

I shall refer to these

briefly afL?he jurisdictional standard argument and
Clauses argument. 2

t~eligion

The argument that the NLRB abused its discretion in
applying its jurisdictional standard begins with the concession
that the NLRB has wide discretion in administering its
self-imposed jurisdictional standards.

Even though the NLRB's

administration of its jurisdictional standards is entitled to

2.

The resps also support the CA 7 decision with the argument

that the NLRA does not give the NLRB jurisdiction over religious
schools.

It points out that when the NLRA was originally

enacted, Catholic schools were staffed exclusively by nuns and
priests, and concludes that Congress never intended the NLRB to
intrude.

The broad language of the jurisdictional section of the

NLRA, however, clearly encompasses the lay teachers at these
schools, and the fact that a statute was written broadly enough
to accommodate changing circumstances should not be held against
it.

Nor do I think there is much to resps' legislative history

argument.

That history shows that while Congress recognized the

NLRB's policy of declining jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis over
non-commercial activities of religious organizations, it never
enacted a proposed amendment that would have made this policy
mandatory.

Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313,

318-19 (1957).

~

...

5.

considerable deference, however, the courts have agreed that
under extraordinary circumstances the NLRB's misinterpretation of
or departure from its own standards might constitute an abuse of
discretion.

~'

NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal Co., 359 F.2d

779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966) (stating this general principle and
citing cases) and NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., 443
F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1971) (departure from NLRB's single-employer
rule tended to cause "unjust discrimination" and "deny adequate
notice" to employer).

In such a case, the NLRB's assertion of

jurisdiction is unlawful, even though within the NLRB's statutory
jurisdiction.
The NLRB misapplied its jurisdictional standard in this
case, the argument continues, by concluding that the schools in
question were not "completely religious."

The purpose of the

schools is to provide a theocentric education, and this religious
~,....,

--

orientation permeates the entire curriculum.

-

This Court has
/~
repeatedly recognized the pervasive religiosity of education in

such schools in its cases striking down various forms of state
aid to the schools.

~.,

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616

(1971) ("substantial religious character" of parochial schools
would require detailed and continuing state surveillance to
ensure secular use only of state supplements for teacher
salaries); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
effect).

u.s. 349 (1975) (to the same

In view of these holdings, and the church's avowed

religious purpose for its schools, the NLRB abused its discretion
in concluding that the schools were not as completely religious
as schools of other religions that earlier had been exempted from
NLRB jurisdiction.

6.

It appears to me that the abuse of discretion attack on
the jurisdictional standard, which finds its statutory basis in
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
an equal protection argument.

u.s.c.

§

706, readily becomes

If the Catholic schools in this

case are as "completely religious" as the schools of other sects
over which the NLRB has declined jurisdiction under its standard,
then the application of the standard has resulted in a denial of
equal protection.

The CA 9 adopted this equal protection

rationale in NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., supra, but
the CA 7 did not mention it in the present case and I would
assume that the parties did not raise it below.
Use of the jurisdictional standard may also create a
First Amendment problem, since it may be argued that application
of the standard requires the NLRB to assess the relative
religiosity of curricula in various religious schools.

This

Court has often warned of the dangers of excessive state
entanglement with religion that may result when the government
must determine the religious content of a course of instruction.
~.,Lemon

v. Kurtzman, supra; and Levitt v. Comm. for Public

Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345

u.s.

67, 70 (1953) (determination that "address" by minister of

the Jehovah's Witnesses was not a sermon, so not allowed in
public park, "merely an indirect way of preferring one religion
over another").

7.

The Religion Clauses argument maintains that the
assertion of jurisdiction over these employers is a violation of
the First Amendment, without regard to any statutory or
constitutional problems associated with the jurisdictional
standard.
This argument maintains that NLRB regulation is a
It

''

violation of the Free Exercise Clause because the certification
of the unions and the orders to bargain impinge on each Bishop's
absolute authority over the affairs of the schools.

Since each

Bishop's authority is rooted in doctrine and reflects the
hierarchical structure of authority in the church, any
interference with or limitation of that authority limits the
Bishop's free exercise of religion.

This argument, as expressed

by CA 7, also asserts that each Bishop's ability to discipline
teachers for reasons of faith and doctrine will be reduced by the
prospect that unfair labor practice charges will be filed by the
teachers.
The second thread in the Religion Clauses argument is
that the NLRB jurisdiction asserted here will lead inevitably to

------

excessive involvement of the government in the affairs of the
church.

If a teacher claims to have been discharged because of

pro-union activities while the Bishop claims that the discharge
was for reasons of faith and doctrine, the NLRB will have to
determine the actual reason for the discharge.

If the employer

places its refusal to agree to contract terms on a claimed
shortage of funds, the NLRB will have to determine whether the

8.

refusal is made in good faith or is only a pretext to avoid
further bargaining.

As presented by theCA 7, this argument

employs the language of "excessive entanglement," and appears to
rest on the prohibition contained in the Establishment Clause.
~·,

Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (to meet

Establishment Clause requirement, statute must, inter alia, "not
foster an excessive government entanglement with religion").
But as one amicus curiae points out, the excessive involvement
claim in this case may also be a claim that constitutional
protections of religious institutional integrity and free
exercise are implicated by a regulatory system that will require
the NLRB to resolve internal church disputes.

This argument

finds its support in the numerous decisions of this Court
refusing to interfere with decisions concerning religious
controversies that are made by duly appointed authorities in
hierarchical churches.
Milivojevich, 426

u.s.

Nicholas Cathedral, 344

See,

~'

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.

696, 710-14 (1976); Kedroff v. Saint

u.s.

94, 116-20 (1952).

I conclude in the following section that this Free

{}- -·~" $-

~~~

~

Exercise claim is mistaken, since the NLRB need not impinge on
religious activities in the process of regulating
labor-management relations in these schools.

---

That conclusion

--

depends, however, on a smoothly and intelligently functioning
administrative process within the NLRB.

The Briefs of resps and

the many amici curiae in this case make it clear that their
principal fear is that the NLRB will inevitably run amok,

...

9.

intruding itself into religious affairs and showing little or no
senstivity to First Amendment concerns.

While I appreciate that

their concerns have a firm foundation in the NLRB's actions under
its ill-considered jurisdictional standard, I am inclined at this
point to think that it would be better to let the NLRB proceed.
It is possible that the NLRB will succeed in walking the narrow
course allowed to it by the Religion Clauses: if it does not,
this Court will hear from the churches soon enough.

?~~
3.
preliminary

Arguments recommending reversal: A vexing
question is what to do about the CA 7's

regarding the NLRB's jurisdictional standard.

~

~ t R"~ .

holai'~~

,,

If the NLRB's

application of the standard was an abuse of discretion in this
case, then the CA 7 could have denied enforcement of the
bargaining order without ever reaching the First Amendment
question.

This would have forced the NLRB to proceed under a new

jursidictional standard which included all religious schools,
thus presenting the constitutional issue squarely in a subsequent
case, or else to forgo jurisdiction over all religiously
associated schools.

Constitutional flaws in the application of

the jurisdictional standard also could have forestalled reaching
the broader Religion Clauses problem.
the NLRB's nunc

~

Instead the CA 7 accepted

tunc alteration of its jurisdictional

dkl-4~

.~

L
~~fii.C~

standard to include all religious schools, and went on to decide
the constitutional question.

NJ.I'J. ~
-~

10.

In their Brief on the merits, the Bishops argue that the
NLRB violated the First Amendment in the jurisdictional inquiry
it made under its self-imposed standard.

The standard, turning

on the distinction between "completely religious" and
"religiously associated" schools, does invite an inquiry into the
details of each school's religious education.
-----~

The resps' Brief

-~

cites examples of examinations of witnesses at the
jurisdictional

hearings that appear to be detailed inquiries

into the proportions of religious and secular content in the
education offered by the schools.

Resps' Br., at 18-19.

This

kind of inquiry is a substantial threat to the free exercise of
religious beliefs, since the NLRB's standards may have a coercive
effect on religious beliefs about the scope of education
required.

It entails an excessive entanglement of government in

the religious educational decisions of church authorities.
N.Y. v. Cathedral Academy, 434

u.s.

See

125, 133 (1977) ("[t]he

prospect of church and state litigating in court about what does
or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment, and it
cannot be dismissed by saying it will happen only once").

'~

!

~.4-~~,·~ (~~

~ ~::~-~ ~ .......At-)J

o-.,,...

~

~~~~~~
There are two ways to deal with the jurisdictional

-

standard
problem, if the Court is to reach the Religion Clauses
...
question.Ql9ne is to accept the

NLRB's~nc

of its standard, as the CA 7 did.

pro tunc alteration

Since the NLRB has the
. /'

authority to reformulate these self-imposed standards at will, in
the course of case-by-case adjudication, it is clear that the
NLRB may assert jurisdiction under the altered standard in any
new proceeding concerning these schools.

--

...

Because the NLRB had

announced its intention to assert jurisdiction over private
~

.._....-.

...,

schools in 1970 (Cornell University, 183 NLRB 329), no problem of
~

~

-

notice is raised by such a nunc pro tunc alteration.

If the

Court takes this course, it should make explict both its
condemnation of the previous jurisdictional standard and its
acceptance of the nunc pro tunc alteration, so that the NLRB is
clearly cut off from any future use of the old standard.
The second possible approach to the jurisdictional
standard problem is for the Court to reverse the CA 7 on the
issue.

This requires adopting the argument that the NLRB's

jurisdictional standard embodies a distinction that fairly
discriminates among religious schools in terms of the purposes of
the NLRA.

The jurisdictional standard first evolved in two cases

in which the NLRB considered extension of its jurisdiction to
schools devoted to teaching Jewish religion and history, and
Hebrew language.

Such schools, devoted exclusively to religious

subjects, are necessarily adjuncts to public schools offering
secular education; as a result, they are small in scale and labor

''

12.

disputes within them can have only the most remote effects on
interstate commerce.

Hence, the NLRB is justified in concluding

that extension of its jurisdiction to such schools would not be
an appropriate use of its limited resources to effectuate the
purposes of the NLRA.

Association of Hebrew Teachers, 210

N.L.R.B. 1053 (1974); Board of Jewish Education, 210 N.L.R.B.
1037 (1974).

In contrast, parochial schools that offer a

complete education in religious and secular subjects necessarily
will have more employees and larger budgets than the "completely
religious" schools, and so are likely to have a greater impact on
interstate commerce.

As for constitutional questions about the

standard, the application of the jurisdictional standard does not
require any assessment of relative religiosity of religiously
associated

schools; the NLRB asks only whether or not the school

also teaches secular subjects.

This limited inquiry draws no

invidious distinctions among religious sects, since its aim is
only the implementation of the secular purposes of the NLRA.

/

There are several problems with this argument.

The NLRB

applied this standard in addition to its usual standards on
dollar of sales or purchases in interstate commerce.

The

jurisdictional standard, then, must have some other purpose than
sorting schools according to their size.

Second, if the NLRB

ever clearly conceived of its standard as a means of classifying
schools by their impact on interstate commerce, the history of
the application of the standard shows that that conception of the
standard was soon lost.

The jurisdictional standard appears to

13.

have become confused with First Amendments limitations on NLRB
authority, see Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216
N.L.R.B. 249 (1975), and Cardinal T. Manning, Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218 (1976).

This confusion about the

purpose of the standard inevitably led to the kind of detailed
inquiry

-

in~~ious c~n_!ent

schools that took place here.

of the education offered bJ the
Finally, if the standard was not

used to discriminate among schools simply on the basis of their
size and impact on interstate commerce, then I think there is
some merit to the equal protection claim of those religious
schools that were subjected to regulation.
The CA 7's treatment of the Religion Clauses argument is
based on an attractive rhetorical_,.,....point-- if Catholic parochial
~

schools are too religious to receive state aid, then they must
also be too religious to allow government regulation of their
labor affairs.

But if this Court's decisions regarding the

Religion Clauses show anything, it is that such sweeping
generalizations have been of little aid in defining the
separation of church and state required by the Constitution.
Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).

It is clear that

the wall-of-separation metaphor has proved inadequate to the
realities of a world in which secular and sectarian institutions
necessarily interact with one another.

In the very case in which

Justice Black stated the metaphor as a guiding principle, the
Court approved state payment of bus fares for parochial school
students.

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).

14.

The Court has since recognized that the line of separation is a
blurred, indistinct, variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.
403

u.s.

Lemon v. Kurtzman,

602, 614 (1971).
Since complete separation is impossible, careful

evalu~..e-ach ~~:_d

(

interaction. between church and state,

in terms of the purposes of the Religion Clauses, is essential.
~~...._,w~

........

,.....,

Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).

In Walz v. Tax

Comm'r, supra, the Court stated that "the basic purpose of [the
Religion Clausesl ... is to insure that no religion be sponsored
or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited."
669.

397

u.s.

at

Careful analysis under these general principles has led to

the approval of many kinds
of government
action
that both aid and
.........__............ ....,.__.
.............
.....
~

impinge on Catholic parochial schools.

~.,property

tax

exemptions (Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra); bus fares for parochial
school students (Everson v. Board of Education, supra); loan of
secular, publicly owned textbooks to private school students
(Board of Education v. Allen, 392

u.s.

236 (1968)); and the

oft-cited examples of police and fire protection, health and
safety regulations, and compulsory attendance laws.
The touchstone of a free exercise of religion claim

~

government coercion in matters of religious faith or practice.
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
In this case, I see no possibility of such coercion of the
Bishops or of the church hierarchy in general, either under the
present bargaining orders or in the hypothetical unfair labor

/

J

~· ~~-15.,.

~IOC.C..~ ~--... ~~

.

.......

~~ ~.---~-## ~ ~

practice proceedings conjured up by theCA 7. The act of~
collective bargaining is not itself contrary to the
\

t~a~-ch:~. -~omp:re

(1972) (compliance

teach~·;-~~

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

u.s. 205

~·

with compulsory school attendance law would

have violated sincerely held religious beliefs of Amish people;
held enforcement of attendance law would be a violation of Free
Exercise of Religion Clause). The certification of a union
representing lay teachers and the order to the Bishop to bargain
with the union do not reduce the Bishop's absolute authority over
the religious life of the school, since his control over the
religious content of instruction and qualifications of teachers
is unaltered.

It will be up to the Bishop to insist, in

bargaining with the union, that those religious prerogatives must
be respected and preserved completely in any contract; in no
event will the Bi shop be required to agree to a dimunition of his
authority in favor of the union.

Assertion of NLRB jurisdiction,

by way of the union certifications and orders to bargain, is
therefore not unlike health, safety, and fire, and attendance
regulations imposed on churches and church schools--intrusions
for limited secular purposes, and having no unconstitutional
effect on the exercise of religious faith and principle.
The bargaining orders themselves do not raise any
questions about the constitutional ljmits on subsequent unfair
labor practice proceedings arising out of the bargaining process
or the discharge of teachers for heretical teaching.

Any

constitutional problems that may arise during the course of

bargaining or the life of the collective bargaining agreement may
be resolved at that time. 3 For the present, it is sufficient

----

to support NLRB jurisdiction that certification of the unions and
-=
c:.bargaining on at least some topics (wages, hours, vacations, and
pensions) do not interfere with the free exercise of religious
beliefs by the Bishops or the church hierarchy in general.
TheCA 7, however, concentrated its attention on the
prospect that such unfair labor practice proceedings would result

td/1 7~
.,.. ,, tlb. .....~

inevitably in future NLRB interference with religious faith and
practice.

I
! ~
~,...c.-p..u.,.

Even if the CA 7 acted properly in assessing the

constitutionality of future unfair labor practice proceedings

J&• ••"~

think.it~~~
practice
IA1.i~.J-4.,,.J...

before the NLRB, it arrived at the wrong conclusion. I
is highly unlikely that in future unfair labor

proceedings related to bargaining or the discharge of teachers,
the Bishops will be forced into actions inconsistent with their
faith and doctrine.

To borrow the CA 7's example, suppose a

teacher who one day makes a strong pro-union address, then the

3.

~,

resps suggest that the Bishop's authority to close a

school in order to divert the money to another religious mission
might be diminished by assertion of NLRB jurisdiction.
this is wrong.

I think

See NLRB v. Jackson Farmers, Inc., 457 F.2d 516

(lOth Cir. 1972) (collecting cases on analogous problem of
contracting out work formerly done by union employees).

In any

event, the First Amenament limits on NLRB authority to interfere
with the Bishop's authority in such matters may be resolved when
the issue arises.

17.

next day teaches his history class an approving lesson about the
crusade for legalization of birth control in this country.

The

Bishop discharges the teacher, who files an unfair labor practice
charge.
The NLRB's investigation of the charge will focus on the
motive of the Bishop in discharging the teacher, and not the
truth or validity of the church's doctrines on birth control.

To

support his discharge of the teacher, the Bishop would have to
show that the discharge was motivated by doctrinal considerations
and the need to protect against heretical teaching.

(Similarly

in the bargaining process itself, the Bishop's statement of
constraints imposed on his bargaining latitude by principles of
faith and doctrine will be final and authoritative.) In
demonstrating his motivation, he might have to show that in other
situations involving the same heresy but no union activity, the
heretic was also discharged; where the same heresy had never
before occurred, the Bishop might be required to show that the
alleged doctrinal basis for the discharge was in fact a sincerely
held tenet of his religious faith.

In short, he would have

to;'~

show that anti-union animus had no place in his decision.
The inquiry need never go further than determining
whether the proffered doctrines are in fact sincerely held
beliefs or are only pretexts to avoid legitimate obligations.
The inquiry into the sincerity of beliefs is not a First
Amendment violation, and is often necessary to ensure adequate
protection of Free Exercise rights.
Yoder, supra.

See,

~,

Wisconsin v.

As long as the Bishop could demonstrate the basis

18.

in faith and doctrine for the discharge of the teacher as a
heretic, the teacher would have no complaint under the NLRA.
It will not be open to the teacher to argue that church doctrine
is in fact different, and to have the NLRB determine the "true"
doctrine.

By hypothesis, if the Bishop could not demonstrate a

basis for the discharge in the doctrine and consistent practice
of the church, then the teaching in question would not have been
a heresy and ordering the rehiring of the teacher does not force
the Bishop to take an action contrary to doctrine and faith. 4
This

limite~

inquiry does not threaten the Bishop's right of free

exercise, and the necessity of the inquiry is not sufficient to
immunize the Bishop from all regulation.

Cf. Associated Press v.

NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (AP had right to discharge employee for
violation of AP's editorial policies but not for unj.on activity,
and could not claim immunity from NLRA on account of First
Amendment protections of the press) .
If the NLRB does allow itself to become a forum for the
resolution of doctrinal disputes properly reserved for the
ecclesiastical courts, Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
supra, then that will be time enough for the Bishop to raise Free
Exercise Clause objections.

4.

~'

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 222 N.L.R.B. No.

156 (1976), enf. denied on relevant point, 549 F.2d 873, 882 (2d
Cir. 1977) (NLRB inquiry into possible anti-union movitation for
discharge of a teacher) .

~

n.4

.

.

~.~.~~
.

,~..;_

.

';I~~~

~

-

~~,.~.41~~

The possibility that u~~ir-l~o; practice proceedings
will be frequent does not strike me as a free
If a church repeatedly violated

~

health and fire regulations, repeated citations and fines would

~

exercise-entanglement problem.

A14o.4~
~

not present a constitutional problem.

It is also clear in this case that the NLRB has not

-

singled out one church, or even churches in general, for
regulation, but has extended its jurisdiction to all private
schools except those too small to have an appreciable effect on
--=

......

interstate commerce.

See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra (tax

exemption extended to all property used for religious,
educational, or charitable purposes).

I regard this as

additional evidence that NLRB enforcement of the statute in this
case has a secular purpose, and is not intended to burden or
restrict the exercise of religious beliefs .

........

~~~

The most significant opportunity presented by this case

~ ~~~is the chance to clarify the analytic distinction between the

~~J· ~ree

-

Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.

The standard

~.,...,~
~~•• ~~r assessing Establishment Clause claims that has been adopted

~~~~

lately by the Court has obscured that distinction, resulting in

~CA confusions
~below.

apparent in the argument and decision of this case

~~The

-

Court recently stated its Establishment Clause

standard in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).

In order

to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, "a statute must
have a secular legislative purpose, must have a principal or

.tu.

primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
must not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion."

There are two troublesome aspects to this standard:

~
.
~

(1) in the second branch of the standard, the indication that a bJ~
governmental action with the primary effect of inhibiting

~~1~.S·
~ '2..S(;,

religion is an Establishment Clause violation; and (2) in the
third branch of the standard, the indication that any excessive
entanglement of government with religion is an Establishment
Clause problem.

While it is the purpose of the Religion Clauses

"to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none
commanded, and none inhibited," Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra, only
part of that purpose is committed to the Establishment Clause.
It

\\

The Establishment Clause is meant to prevent government
aid to religion in gaining and keeping adherents.

Abington

School Dist. v. Schempp, supra, 374 U.S. at 228 (Douglas, J.,
cone.).

The "establishment" of a religion "connotes sponsorship,

financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activities."
668.

Walz v. Tax Comm'r, supra, 397 U.S. at

Establishment clause problems arise when state aid to

religion or religious institutions has the purpose or primary
effect of encouraging religion, or brings with it the possibility
of excessive government entanglement in the course of
administration of the aid.

~,

McCollum v. Board of Education,

333 U.S. 203 (1948), and Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (released time programs in public schools); Engel v.
Vitale, 370

.•.
'

u.s.

421 (1962) (government support of daily prayer in

21.

public schools):

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97

(1968) (statute requiring public school teachers to teach only
Biblical explanation of creation of man): Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 ( 1971) (public funds used to supplement teacher salaries
in private sectarian schools): and Hunt v. McNair, 413

u.s.

744

(1973) (funds for construction of buildings by sectarian
college).
Where no state aid to religion is involved, but only
regulation impinging on religious activity or institutions, we
will keep the categories of First Amendment analysis clearer and
more precise if we treat the proposed regulation as a Free
Exercise problem only.

The threat in a case such as the present

one, involving only regulation, is not one of sponsorship and
fostering of religion in general or of a particular sect, but of
interference with religious doctrine and faith in the course of
regulation. 5 A useful example is Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra,
involving state compulsory school attendance laws and treated by
this Court as a Free Exercise problem.

This is also the type of

question raised

5.

It is possible to argue that by imposing regulation on

one religion, the government aids other religions, so that the
regulation becomes a law "respecting an
religion."

establishment of

But if the regulation has a secular purpose and

involves no active governmental aid or sponsorship of the
unregulated religions, then the problem can be dealt with more
clearly by treating it as a Free Exercise question only, rather
than by adopting this backhanded Establishment Clause theory.

22.

when the courts are asked to interfere in the internal governance
of churches.

See,

~,

Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.

Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at 710-14: and Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, supra, 344

u.s.

at 116-20.

Though the

problem of regulation unrelated to aid may be characterized as
one of "entanglement" of government in religious affairs, it is
not an Establishment Clause problem at all.
supra, 403 U.S. at 634 (Douglas, J., cone.).

Lemon v. Kurtzman,
To the extent that

the Establishment Clause standard lately adopted by the Court
appears to include all instances of "entanglement," it confuses
rather than facilitates analysis.
The rule that a governmental action with a primary
1\

,,

effect that inhibits religion is an Establishment Clause
violation also errs in defining the ambit of the Establishment
Clause.
~

I think this is apparent from a close examination of

this Court's Establishment Clause cases.

~;~)dealt wi~h
~

~

~

statutes that had the effect (primary or secondary) of

te.ncourag1ng religion.

In fact, in several cases the

Establishment Clause standard has been stated only in terms of

~""aid

a,.,r-'t
!..L~
~

All of these cases have

to or advancement of religion.

Pulbic Education, 413

u.s.

~,

Levitt v. Comm. for

472, 481 (1973) ("The essential inquiry

in each case .•. is whether the challenged state aid has the
primary purpose or effect of advancing religion or religious

~ucation

or whether it leads to excessive entanglement by the

~ State in the affairs of the religious institution"): cf. Hunt v.
McNair, 413

u.s.

734, 743 (1973) (after quoting "advances nor

23.

inhibits" standard, focused Establishment Clause inquiry entirely
on question of when aid may be thought to have "primary effect of
advancing religion").
Education

v~Nyquist,

Your own opinion in Comm. for Public

.

.(

413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973), 1s the ony clear
..

.

recent attribution of the "or inhibits religion" standard to the
Free Exercise Clause.
"[T]his Court has repeatedly recognized that tension
inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses [citing cases]
As a result
of this tension, our cases require the State to maintain
an attitude of 'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' nor
'inhibiting' religion."
Since this case involves no governmental aid to
religion, it should be treated as at LFree Exercise case' ' and not as
an Establishment Clause case.

--- ==-

The foregoing clarification of the

doctrine relating these two clauses will facilitate this approach
and provide more useful guidance in future litigation.
If the accepted Establishment Clause standard is applied
to this case, I think it works out as follows.

There can be no

doubt that the NLRA has a secular legislative purpose, the
minimization of disruptions of interstate commerce through the
fostering of peaceful labor-management relations.

The difficulty

arises in applying the effect and entanglement criteria.
The primary effect of application of the NLRA to the
Catholic schools is the fostering of collective bargaining
between the religious authorities of the schools and the lay
teachers.

As the foregoing discussion has stressed, nothing

about the process of collective bargaining directly encourages or

24.

inhibits religion.

No public funds are used to support any of

the activities of the church.

Unionization may make it more

expensive to run schools that are unionized after assertion of
NLRB jurisdiction, but this is the same kind of incidental effect
that accompanies health, safety, and fire regulations.

The fact

that the schools of some religions may be subjected to NLRB
jurisdiction and others not also seems to me an incidental effect
of a statute with a primarily secular effect.

See McGowan v.

Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing law with secular
purpose, and differential impact on those who worshipped on the
Sabbath, did not amount to an Establishment Clause violation).
The question of entanglement is one of degree.

The

cases in which the Court has found a significant threat of
excessive entanglement have involved situations in which the
state would have been required to make detailed assessments of
the religiosity of classroom materials and teaching in order to
ensure that state aid was not used for sectarian education.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, and Earley v. DiCenso, 403

u.s.

In

602,

618-19 (1971), to administer programs of supplements to teacher
salaries in private schools, the state would have been required
to monitor teaching constantly and carefully to ensure secular
use only of the state funds.

In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,

369-70 (1975), and Wollman v. Wallace, supra, ensuring secular
use of publicly supplied "auxiliary services" (remedial and
accelerated instruction, guidance counseling, speech and hearing

25.

services provided in the sectarian schools, and field trips)
would have required excessive entanglement between church and
state.

Similarly in Levjtt v. Comm. for Public Education, supra

the Court concluded that there was no means of ensuring secular
use of public funds meant to pay for tests prepared by teachers
in sectarian schools.
In contrast, where government aid can be confined to
secular uses without extensive government intrusion into the
day-to-day operations of religious schools, the Court has found
no threat of entanglement.

~,

Board of Education v.

Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (secular content of textbooks could be
ascertained): Everson v. Board of Education, supra (bus
transportation for parochial school students): Hunt v. McNair,
supra (aid for construction of buildings by sectarian college):
and the oft-cited examples of police and fire protection.
Regulation of labor relations under the NLRA will not
\require review of the religious activities of the Bishops.

If a

teacher is discharged for heresy, the only question will be
whether anti-union motives in fact precipitated the discharge.
It will not be open to the teacher to dispute the Bishop's
statement of the requirements of faith and doctrine.

The only

other involvement of the NLRB, and the only question actually
raised by the NLRB's petition for enforcement of its bargaining
order, will be the monitoring of bargaining between the employers
and the unions to ensure good faith bargaining, and none of the
parties has suggested a way in which this supervision might

~o.

entangle the government in the religious affairs of the church.
4.

Conclusion.

I recommend

accepting the NLRB's

retroactive alteration of its jurisdictional standard rather tha
reversing theCA 7's holding that the NLRB's assertion of
jurisdiction under the standard was unlawful.

On the First

Amendment question, I recommend reversing the CA 7 on the ground
that the certification of the unions and the orders to bargain do
not interfere with anyone's free exercise of religion.

If it is

necessary to also consider likely future events in the course of
NLRB regulation, then I also recommend concluding that the
prospects of interference with free exercise of religion are
remote enough to be left future litigation and do not require
invalidating all regulation by the NLRB.
Bruce Boisture

BB
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 77-752, Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB
The SG has filed a Reply Brief.

The only arguments

deserving special note concern the NLRB's jurisdictional
standard for discriminating between "completely religious"
and "religiously associated" schools.
The SG contends that the jurisdictional standard is
not based on any notion that the First Amendment prohibits
NLRB jurisdiction over "completely religious" schools.

Rather,

the Nlrb's self-imposed jurisdictional limitation is meant,
like the other jurisdictional limits it observes, to effectuate
the policy of the Act by husbanding its limited regulatory
resources.

The SG also contends that application of the standard
does not require any inquiry into the nature or content of

- -- -----·

_

---------~- -~ -~------------------

religious
instruction in the schools.
.

'~he

Board declines

_..___..,_____..,.____~

jurisdiction only over education institutions that essentially
limit themselves to providing supplementary religious instructions
during after school hours and that do not seek to provide
an alternative to public school •. education or to satisfy state
compulsory education requirements.

The Board asserts

jurisdiction over all other schools whose gross revenue meets
the $1 million monetary standard, regardless of whether such
schools are religiously affiliated or the education provided
by the schools is offered with a religious orientation."
I discussed some of these points in my Bench

(r,P· 9-/.d

Memorandu~

It is not clear from the way in which the jurisdictional
standard has been applied that the NLRB has restricted itself
to the kind of secular inquiry that the SG describes, though
it is clearly possible to apply the standard on the basis of
such a limited inquiry.

Th~em,

which the SG does

not resolve, is that religious schools that do not attempt to
provide a complete education, but that have operating budgets
satisfying the NLRB's usual measure for jurisdictional impact
on interstate commerce, are exempted from NLRB jurisdiction.

l

This is plainly arbitrary, and the SG has offered no reason to
explain why it is not.

Further, to the extent that the distinction

thus drawn is highly correl..........ated with the particular religious

affiliations of the schools involved, it may raise Establishment
Clause problems.

--·

On the whole, I think that the Court would

------

do well to disapprove
this standard, and force the NLRB back
__________
to the use of clearly articulated and easily ascertainable
~-"-----......

~_

criteria such as size of work force and annual operating budget.

)V"
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N atioual Labor Rela.tions Board.
Petitioner,

v.
The Catholic Bishop of
Chicago et al.

(~.yW~S')
/;~- ·

~v

u.rvvvr.-..

~~.

On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

[January - , 1979]
CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opmwn

Court,
This case arises out of the ~ational Labor Relations Board's
exercise of JUrisdiction over lay faculty members at two
groups of Catholic high schools. We gran ted certiorari to
consider two questions. (a) Whether teachers in schools
operated by a church to teach both religious and secular
subJects are within the Jurisdiction granted by the National
Labor Relations Act; and (b) If the Act authorizes such
jurisdiction, does its exercise violate the guarantees of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment? 434 U. S. 1061
( 1978 ),

I
Une group of schools 1s operated by the Catholic Bishop of

Chicago, a corporation sole; the other group is operated by
tho Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc. The group
operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago consists of two
schools, Quigley North aud Quigley South. 1 Those schools
are termed "mi11or semiJJaries" because of their role m
ed ncatmg lugh school students who may become priests.
'The Ca.thohc Bi:;hop operates other :schools in the Clurago area, but
they were not involved m the proceedings before the Board.

77-752-0PINION
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At one time. only students who manifested a positive and
confirmed desire to be priests were admitted to the Quigley
schools. In 1970 the requirement was changed so that students admitted to these schools need not show a definite
inclination toward the priesthood. Now the students need
only be recommended by their parish priest as having a
potential for the priesthood or for Christian leadership. The
schools continue to provide special religious instruction not
offered in other Catholic secondary schools. The Quigley
schools also offer essentially the same college preparatory
curnculum as public secondary schools. Their students participate in a variety of extracurricular activities which include
secular as well as religious events. The schools are recognized by the State and accredited by a regional educational
organization.2
The Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., has five high
schools. 8 Unlike the Quigley schools. the special recommendatwn of a priest IS not a prerequisite for admission.
Like the Quigley schools, however, these high schools seek to
provide a traditional secular education but oriented to the
tenets of the Roman Catholic faith; religious training is also
mandatory. These schools are similarly certified by the State. 4
~ J{p(•ord, at :m:~ . A:> explained to tht• Board'o; Hearing Officer, in Illinois
the term ''approval " is d1~tmct from " recognition.'' Before a ~chool may
opC'ratc, It mu~t be approved by the State's Department of Education.
Approval ts given when a school mret~ the minimal requirements under
lltatc Jaw, ~uch as for compulsory attendance; approval doel:' not require
any rvaluat10n of the :;chool's program. Recognition, which is not requin"d
to U}H'nttl', Js given only after the ::~chool ha;; pa~::;ed the State's evaluation.
'The Diocese also has 47 elementary schools. They were not involved
in the procredings before the Board.
'Rec·ord at. 77. As explained to the Board's Hearing Officer, "certificatiOn" by the State of Indiana 1::1 roughly equivalent to " recognition" hy
the State of IllinOis . Both are voluntary procedures which involve some
evaluation by the state educatwnal authorities. See Ind. Code § 20-10.1~- l

2.
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In 1974 and 1975 separate representation petitions were
filed with the Board by interested union organizations for
both the quigley and the Fort Wayne-South Bend schools;
representation was sought only for lay teachers." The schools
challenged the assertion of jurisdiction on two grounds:
(a) that they do not fall within the Board's discretionary
jurisdictional criteria; and (b) that the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment preclude the Board's jurisdiction. The
Board rejected the jurisdictional arguments on the basis of
its decision in Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216
N. L . .R. B. 249 (1975). There the Board explained that its
policy was to decline jurisdiction over religiously sponsored
organizations "only when they are completely religious, not
just religiously associated." I d., at 250. Because neither
group of schools was found to fall within the Board's "completely religious" category, the Board ordered elections. 'The
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sol<!, 220 N. L. R. B.
359 (1975) .6
ln the Board-supervised election at the Quigley schools, the
Quigley Education Alliance, a union affiliated with the Illinois
Education Association, prevailed and was certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative for 46 lay teachers. In
the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, the Community
Alliance for Tea.chers of Catholic High Schools, a similar
union organization, prevailed and was certified as the representative for the approximately 180 lay teachers. Notwithstanding the Board's order, the schools declined to recognize
~ The certification and order cover only "all full-time and regular
part-tnne lay teachers, including physical education teachers ... ; excluding !1Pctor::;, procurators, dPan of studies, business manager, director of
~tudent activities, direct.or of formation, director of counseling services,
office clencal employPes, maintenance employees, cafeteria workers, watch··
men, librarians, nurses, all religwus faculty, and all guards and supervisors
a ~ drfined in the Act, . .
~~
6 The decisiOn of the Hegional Director in Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bendl Inc ,, io. not repurtrd

'•
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the unions or to bargain. The unions filed unfair labor
practice complaints with the Board under ~§ 8 (a) (1) and (5)
of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. ~§ 158 (a)
(1) and (5). The schools opposed the General Counsel's
motion for summary judgment, again challenging the Board's
exercise of jurisdictiou over religious schools on both statutory
and constitutional grounds.
The Board reviewed the record of previous proceedings and
concluded that all of the arguments had been raised or could
have been raised in those earlier proceedings. Since the
arguments had been rejected previously, the Board granted
summary judgmeut, holding that it had properly exercised its
statutory discretion iu asserting jurisdiction over these schools. 7
The Board concluded that the schools had violated the Act
and ordered that they cease their unfair labor practices and
that they bargain collectively with the unions. 'l'he Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, A Corporation Sole, 224 N. L. R. B.
1221 (1976); Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224
N . L. R. B. 1226 (1976) .

II
The schools challenged the Board's orders in petitions to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. That court
denied enforcement of the Board's orders. Catholic Bishop
7 The Board relied on its reasoning in Cardinal Ti·m othy Manning,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of the At·chdiocese of Los Angeles, A Corporation Sole, 22:3 N. L. R. B. 1218, 1218 (1976): "We also do not agree
that the schools are r£'ligious institutions intimat£'1y involved with the
Catholic Church. It hn,; hrrc!ofom b('(.'n the Board's policy to decline
jurisdiction ovf'r institutions only whf'n they are completely religious, not
just religiously associated. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore,
Archdwcesan High Schools, 216 N. L. R. B. 249 (1975) . The schools
perform in part the :,;rcular function of educating childrf'n, and in part
concern themselves with l't>ligious instrnction. Therefore, we will not
decline to asSPrt junsdiction over these schools on such a. basis. Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, Archdio('esan lligh Schools, supra.'~
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of Chicago, A Corporat'ion Sole v. NLRB, 559 F. 2d 1112
(CA7 1977). 8 The court considered the Board's actions in
relation to its discretion in choosing to extend its jurisdiction
only to religiously affiliated schools that were not "completely
religious." It concluded that the Board had not properly
exercised its discretion, because the Board's distinction between
"completely religious" and "merely religiously associated"
faileci to provide a workable guide for the exercise of
discreti();:
-

"We find the standard itself to be a simplistic black or
white, purported rule containing no borderline demarcation of where 'completely religious' takes over or, on the
other hand, ceases. In our opinion the dichotomous 'completely religious-merely religiously associated' standard
provides no workable guide to the exercise of discretion.
The determination that an institution is so completely a
religious entity as to exclude any viable secular components obviously implicates very sensitive questions of
faith and tradition. See, e. g., [Wisconsin v.j Yoder, ... ,
406 U.S. 205 [(1972)] ." 559F. 2d, at 1118.
The Com·t of Appeals recogniz:ed that the rejection of the
Board's policy as to church-operated schools meant that the
Board would extend its jurisdiction to aU church-operated
schools. The court therefore turned to the question of whether
the Board could exercise that jurisdiction, consistent with
constitutioual limitations. It concluded that both the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment foreclosed the Board's jurisdiction. It reasoned
that from the initial act of certifying a union as the bargainiug agent for lay teachers the Board's action would impinge
8 Cf. Caulfield v. Hirsch, 410 F. Supp. 618 (ED Pa. 1977) (Pnjoining
Board from assprting ,iuri;;diction over eiPmentary schools in Archdiocese
of Ph1ladrlphia) . This ra:-;e is presently undN review by the Court of
Appeals for the Th1rd Circuit. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiora.ri, at
A7o, Cau.ljield V. l-li1·8rh,. No . n - 1411, rert. denied, 4:{6 u . S. 957 (1978) .

1

77-752-0PINION
LRB v CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO

upon the freedom of church authorities to sha.pe and direct
teaching in accord with the requirements of their religion. It
analyzed the Board 's action in this way :
" At some poiut, factual inquiry by courts or agencies
into such matters I separating secular from religious trainmg] would almost necessarily raise First Amendment
problems. If history den10nstrates, as it does, that Roman
Catholics founded an alternative school system for essentially religious reasons and continued to maintain them as
an 'integral part of the religious mission of the Catholic
Church, ' Lemon I v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602], 616
r (1971) l' courts and agencies would be hard pressed t0
take official or judicial notice that these purposes were
undermined or eviscerated by the determination to offer
such secular subjects as mathematics, physics, chemistry,
aud English literature." 559 F. 2d, at 1118.
The court distinguished local regulations which required
fire inspections or state laws mandating attendance, reasoning
that they did not "have the clear inhibiting potential upon
the relationship between teachers and employers with which
the present Board order is directly concerned." Ibid. The
court held that interference with management prerogatives,
found acceptable in an ordinary commercial setting, was not
acceptable in an area protected by the First Amendment.
"The real difficulty is found in the chilling aspect that the
req uircment of bargaining will impose on the exercise of the
bishops' control of the religious mission of the schools." Id.,
at 1124.
Ill
The Board's assertion of Jurisdiction over private schools is,
as we noted earlier, a relatively recent development. Indeed,
m 1951 the Board indicated that it would not exercise jurisdiction over nonprofit, educational institutions because to do
so would not effectuate the purposes of the Act. The Trustees:
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of Columbia University in the City of New York, 97
N. L. R. B. 424 (1951). In 1970, however, the Board pointed
to what it saw as au increased involvement in commerce by
educational institutions and concluded that this required a
different positioH 011 j'urisdictiou. In Cornell University, 183
N. L. R. B. 329 (1970), the Board overruled its Columbia
University decision. Cornell University was followed by the
assertion of jurisdiction over non profit, private secondary
schools. Shattuck School, 189 N. L. R. B. 886 (1971). See
also Judscn School, 209 N. L. R. B. 677 ( 1974). The Board
now assert~..J~isdiction over all private. nonprofit, educational institu1ions wiTh gross annual revenues tfiat meet its
j unsdlCtwual requirements whether they are secular or religious. 29 CFR ~ 103.1 ( 1977). See, e. g., Academia San
Jorge, 234 N. L. R. B. No. 183 (1978) (advisory opinion
stating that Board would not assert jurisdiction over Catholic
educational institution which did not meet jurisdictional
sta11dards); The Windsor School, Inc., 199 N. L. R. B. 457, 200
N. L. R. B. 991 (1972) (declining jurisdiction where private,
proprietary school did not rneet JUrisdictional amounts).
That broad assertion of jurisdiction has not gone unchallenged. But the Board has rejected the contentiou that the·
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment bar the extension
of its JUrisdiction to church-operated schools. Where the·
Board has declined to exercise jurisdiction, it has done so only
on the grounds of the employer's minimal impact on commerce. Thus, iu Association of Hebrew Teachers of M '3tropol~tan Detroit, 210 N. L. R. B. 1053 ( 1974). the Board did
110t assert Jurisdictiou over the Association which offered
courses in Jewish culture in after-school classes. a nursery
school. and at a college. The Board termed the Association
a11 "'isolated instance of [an] atypica1 employer.''
!d., at
10.5~- 1059.
lt explained that "[w]hether an employer falls
within a given 'class' of enterprise depends upon those of its
activiti<'s which are predominant and give the employing
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activity its character. . . . [T]he fact that an employer's
activity ... is dedicated to a sectarian religious purpose is
not a sufficient reason for the Board to refrain from asserting
jurisdiction." !d., at 1058. Cf. Board of Jewish Education
of Greater Washington, D. C., 210 N. L. R. B. 1037 (1974).
In the same year the Board asserted jurisdictiou over an
association chartered by the State of New York to operate
diocesan high schools. Henry M. Hald High School Association, 213 N. L. R. B. 415 (1974). It rejected the argument
that its assertion of .i urisdiction would produce excessive
governmental entanglement with religion. In the Board's
view, the Association had chosen to entangle itself with the
secular world when it decided to hire lay teachers. I d., at
418 n. 7.u
When it ordered an election for the lay professional employees at five parochial high schools in Baltimore in 1975,
the Board reiterated its belief that exercise of its jurisdiction
is not contra.ry to the First Amendment:
61
• • • the Board's policy in the past has been to decline
·jurisdiction over similar institutions only when they are
completely religious, not just religiously associated, and
the Archdiocese concedes that instruction is Hot limited
to religious subjects. That the Archdiocese seeks to
provide an education based on Christiall principles does
not lead to a contrary conclusion. Most religiously assoCiated institutions seek to operate in conformity with
their religious tenets.'' Rornan Catholic Archdiocese of
Baltimore, 216 N. L. R. B. 249, 250 (1975).
'The Board rejected the First Amendment claims in Cardinal
Timothy Manning, Rorna:n Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, A eorporation Sole, 223 N. L. R. B.
9
The Board went on to explain lhat the rights guaranteed by § 7 of the
Act, 29 U. S. C. § 157, were "a part of our national heritage established
by Congress, [and] were a legitimate ·cxerci~c of Congress' constitutionaT
}>OWPI'.'' 2 Ja N L R B., at 418 11 7.
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1218, 1218 (1976): "Regulation of labor relations does not
vwlate the First Amendment when it involves a minimal
intrusion on religious conduct ami is necessary to obtain that
[the Act's] objective." (Emphasis added.)
The ~oard thus reco£22 izes that its assertion of jurisdiction
over teachers in religious schools constitutes some de ee of
) intrusion into the administration of the a a1rs of church~
operated schools. Implicit in the Board's distinction between
schools that are "completely religious'' and those "religiously
associated' ' is also an acknowledgement of some degree of
entanglement. Because that distinction was measured by a
school's involvement with commerce. however, and not by its
religious association, it is clear that the Board never envis~
ioned any sort of religious litmus test for determining when to
assert jurisdiction. Nevertheless. by expressing its traditionaJ
jurisdictional standards in First Amendment terms, the Board
has plainly recognized that intrusion into this area could run
afoul of the Religion Clauses and hence preclude jurisdiction
on constitutional grounds.

IV
That there are constitutional limitations on the Board's
actions has been repeatedly recognized by this Court even
while acknowledging the broad scope of the grant of .iurisdic~
tion. In one of the early Board cases to reach this Court we
said that the "Act ou its face ... evidences the intention of
Congress to exercise whatever power is constitutionally given
to It to regulate commerce.'' NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U. S.
601, 607 (1939) (emphasis added). Later, the Court sum~
marized intervening decisions when it wrote:
"This Court has consistently declared that in passing the
)iational Labor Relations Act. Congress intended to and
did vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth
constitutwnally permissible under the Commerce Clause."
N LRB v. Reliance Fuel Corporation, 371 U. S. 224, 220.
(1963) (emphasis a.lteredL
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The First Amendment, on its face, of course, is a limitation
on the power of Congress. Thus, if we were to conclude that
the Act granted the challenged jurisdiction over these teachers we would be required to decide whether that was "constitutionally permissible" under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment.
Although the respondents press their claims under the
Religion Clauses. the question we consider first is whether
Congress intended the Board to have jurisdiction over teachers iu chUI'ch-o})Crated schools. In a number of cases the
Court has heeded the essence of Chief Justice Marshall's
admonition in The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 64,
118 (1804), by holding that an Act of Congress ought not
be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available. Moreover, the Court has
followed this policy in the interpretation of the Act now
before us and related statutes.
In International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367
U. S. 740 (1961), for example, the Court considered claims
that serious First Amendment questions would arise if the
Railway Labor Act were construed to allow compulsory union
dues to bP used to support political candidates or causes not
approved by some members. The Court echoed Chief Justice
Marshall: "Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid
serious doubt of their constitutionality.' ' ld., at 749. Accordingly the Court looked first to the Act itself to determine
whether it could be read so as to avoid reaching the constitutional question. After examining the legislative history of
the Act the Court construed the Act so as to avoid the First
Amendment questions. I d., at 770.
Similarly in McCulloch v. Sociedad N acional de M arineros
de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), the Court declined to read
the National Labor Relations Act so as to give rise to a
serious question of separation of powers which in turn would
have implicated sensitive issues of the exclusive authority of
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the Executive over relations with foreign nations. The internatioual implications of the case led the Court to describe it
as involving "public questions particularly high in the scale
of our national interest." I d., at 17. Because of those questions the Court held that before sanctioning the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction "'there must be present the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed.'" !d., at 21-22
(quoting Benz v. Compa;nia Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U. S. 138,
147 (1957) ) .
The values enshrined in the First Amendment plainly rank
high "in the scale of our na.t ional values.'' In keeping with
the Court's prudential policy it is incumbent on us to determine whether the Board's exercise of its jurisdiction here
would give rise to serious constitutional questions. If so, we \
must first identify "the affirmative intention of the Cougress
clearly expressed" before concluding that the Act grants
jurisdiction .

v

In recent decisions involving aid to parochial schools we
have recognized the critical and unique role of the teacher in
fulfilling the mission of a church-operated school. What was
said of the schools in Lemon v. Kurtzma;n, 403 U.S. 602, 617
( 1971) , is true of the schools in this case: "Religious authority necessarily pervades the school system." The key role
playt>u by teachers in such a school system has been the
predicate for our conclusions that govern men tal aid channeled
through teachers creates an impermissible risk of excessive
governmental entanglement in the affairs of the churchopt>rated schools. For example, in Lemon, supra, at 617, we
wroli<' •

" ln terms of potential for wvolving some aspect of faith
or morals ttl secular subjects, a textbook's content is
ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not.
We cannot ignore the uanger that a teacher under religwus control and disciplint> poses to the separation of the
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religious from the purely secular aspects of pre-college
education. The conflict of functions inheres in the
situation." (Emphasis added.)
Only recently we again noted the importance of the teacher's function in a church school: "Whether the subject is
'remedial reading,' 'advanced reading,' or simply 'reading,' a
teacher remains a teacher, and the danger that religious
doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction persists." Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U. S. 349, 370 (1975). Cf.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 244 (1977); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, supra, at 635 (Justice Douglas concurring). Good
intentions by government--or third parties-can no more
avoid entanglement with the religious mission of the school
in the adversary setting of collective bargaining than in the
well motivated legislative efforts we found unacceptable in
Lemon, Meek, and Wolman.
The Board argues that it ca.n avoid excessive entanglement
since it will resolve only factual issues such as whether an
anti-union animus motivated an employer's action. But at '
this stage of our consideration we are not compelled to determine whether the entanglement is excessive as we would
were we considering the constitutional issue. Rather, our
in uir is directed toward determinin whether there ISa
significant risk that the First Amendment will e infringed.
- Moreover-:-it is already clear that the Board's actions will
go beyond resolving factual issues. The Court of Appeals'
opinion refers to charges of unfair labor practices filed against
religious schools. 559 F. 2d, at 1125, 1126. The court observed that in those cases the schools had responded that
their challenged actions were mandated by their religious
creeds. The resolution of such charges by the Board, in many
mstances, will necessarily involve inquiry into the good faith
of the position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its
relationship to the school's religious mission. It is not only
the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may

y
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impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but the
very process of inquiry leading to finding and conclusions. 10
The Board's exercise of jurisdiction will have at least one
other impact on church-operated schools. The Board will be
called upon to decide what are "terms and conditions of
employmellt" and therefore manda.tory subjects of bargaining.
Sec 29 U. S. C. ~ 158 (d). Although the Board has not
interpreted that phrase as it relates to educational institutions, similar state provisions provide insight into the effect of
mandatory bargaining. The Oregon Court of Appeals noted,
"nearly everything that goes ou in the schools affects teachers
and is therefore arguably a 'condition of employment.' "
Spr-ingfield Education Assocwtion v. Springfield School District No. 19, 24 Ore. App. 751, 759, 547 P. 2d 647, 650 (1976).
The Peunsylvania Supreme Court aptly summarized the
effect of maudatory bargaming when it observed that the
''mtroduction of a concept of mandatory collective bargaining,
regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiations is defined,
necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former
autonomous position of management." Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board v. Statz College Area School District, 461
Pa. 494, 504, 337 A. 2d 262, 267 (1975). Cf. Clark County
School District v. Local Government Employee Management
Relatwns Board, 530 P. 2d 114, 117-118 (Nev. 1974). See
M. Lieberman and M. Moskow, Collective Negotiations for
Teachers 221-247 (1966). Congress has plainly authorized
such encroachment upon the former autonomous position of
management; our later discussion will take note that Congress
has not done so on the historic autonomy of church-operated
schools. Inevitably the Board's inquiry will implicate sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts between clergyIll Tlus kind of inquiry and n:; ,;ent>Itivily is illustrated in the examma~
non of ;\JonsJgnor O'Donnell by the Board's Hearing Officer, which .is
reprodueed nt an tl[lJlt>ndJx to t h1:; opmion,
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administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators for
unious. \Vhat we said in Lemon, supra, at 616, applies as
·well here :
"
. parochial schools involve substau tial religious
activity and purpose.
"The substantial religious character of these churchr-elated schools gives rise to entangling church-state relationships of thP kind the Religion Clauses sought to
avoid."
Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized this in his coucurring opinion
in Lemon, noting "the admitted and obvious fact that the
rmso11 d'etre of parochial schools is the propagation of religious faith. " Id., at 628.
The church-teacher relationship ill a church-operated school
differs from the employment relationship in a public or other
non-religious school. We see no escape from such conflicts
flowing from the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over churchopc>rated schools and the consequeut serious First Amendment
questions that would follow. We therefore turn to au exammation of the National Labor Relations Act to decide whether
it must be r0ad to con er jurisdiction that would in turn
require a decision on the constitutional claims raised by
respolH]eu ts.

VI
•rhere is no clear expression of CongTess' affirmative intentlOn that teachers in church-operated schools should be
cowred by the Act. Congress, however, defined the Board's
.iurisdiction ill very broad terms and we must therefore examine the legislative history of the Act to determine WEe!her
Congress con ten1plate(J tliat tfie gran t of jurisdictiott would
Inc! udP t<>achers in such schools.
Itt enacting the ~ational Labor Helations Act in 1935,
Congress sought to protect the right of American workers to
bargain collectively. The concern that was repeated throughout the debates was tlw need to assure workers the right to

,.
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77-752-0PINJON
NLRB v. CATHOLIC BISHOP OF CHICAGO

15

organize to counterbalance the collective activities of em~
ployers' which had been authorized by the National Industrial
Recovery Act. But congTessional attention focused on employment in private industry and on industrial recovery.
See, e. y., 79 C'ong. Rec. 7573 (1935) (remarks of Sen.
Wagner), 2 N. L. R. B .. Legislative History of the National
Labor Relatious Act 1935, pp. 2341. 2343.
Our examination of the statute and its legislative history ~
indicates that Congress simply gave no consideration to
church-operated schools. One "straw in the wind'' is that the
Senate Committee on Education and Labor chose a college
professor's dispute with the college as an example of employeremployee relations not covered by the Act. S. Rep. No. 573,
74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7, 2 N. L. R. B., Legislative History of
the National Labor Relations Act 1935. p. 2307.
Congress' next major consideration of the jurisdiction of
the Board came during the passage of the Labor Management
Relatious Act of 1947. commonly known as the Taft-Hartley
Act. Iu that Act Congress amended the definition of "employer" in § 2 of the original Act to exclude nonprofit hospitals. 61 Stat. 136, 29 F. S.C. § 152 (2) (1970 ed.). There [
was some discussion of the scope of the Board's juriscliction
but the consensus was that nouprofit institutions in general
did not fall within the Board's jurisdiction because they did
not affect commerce. See H. R. 3020, 80th Coug .. 1st Sess.
(1947). 1 N. L. R. B .. Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act. 1947. p. 34 (hereinafter Legislative
History); H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong.. 1st Sess., 12
(1947), 1 Legislative History. p. 303; H. R. Rep. No. 510,
80th Cong .. 1st ~ess. , 3. 32 ( 1947), 1 Legislative History, pp.
507. 536; 93 Coug. Rec. 4997 (1947). 2 Legislative History,
p. 1464 lremarks of ~ens. Tydings and Taft). 11
u The ~allonal L~thor Helations Act. was amended again when Congress
pm;i:l?d thr Labor-Management Reporting and Disclo~me Act in 1959. 73
Stat, 519. Tlwt Aet. mad<' no change::; in the definition of '·employer" and
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Tlw most recent significant amenclmen t to the Act was
passed in 1074, removing the exemption of nonprofit hospitals. Pub. L. No. 93-360. 88 Stat. 395. The Board relies
upon that amendment as showing that Congress approved
the Board's exercise of jurisuiction over church-operated
schools. A close examination of that legisla.tive history, howewr. reveals nothing to indicate any affirmative intention
that such schools be within tho Boa.rcl's jurisdiction. Since
the Board did not assert j urisuiction over teachers in a
church-operated school until after the 1974 anwndmont
nothing in the history of the amenclmeJJt can be read as
reflecting C'ongress' tacit approval of the Board's action.
During the debate there were expressions of concern about
the effect of the bill on employees of religious hospitals whose
religious beliefs would not permit them to join a union. 120
Cong. Rec. 12968, 16914 ( 1974). Legislative History of the
Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals under the National Labor
Relations Act, 1974 (Committee Print prepared by the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor a11d
Public Welfare), 93J Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 118, 331 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Ervin and Rep. Erlenborn). The result of
those concerns was an amenument which reflects congressional
seusitivity to First Amenumeut guarantees:
"Any employee of a health care institution who is a,
member of and auheres to established and traditional
tenets or teachings of a bona fiue religion, body, or sect
which has historically held conscie11tious objections to
joiniug or financially supporting labor organizations shall
not be required to join or financially support any labor
organization as a comlition of employment; except that
such employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues
and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such clues and
the leg1~lative hi:<tory <:ontain~ uo referm0<' fo ('hurch-op(•rated :-whools.
See genrrally :\f. L. R. B., L(•gi:;lafive Hist ory of tlw T.. thor-\{anagrmwt
Heportilll{ and DJ:sclosurP A('l of 1959

,..-,
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initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund exempt
from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of Title 26,
chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such
funds, designated in a contract between such institution
and a labor organization. or if the contract fails to desig~
nate such funds. then to any such fund chosen by the
employee." 29 U . S. C. § 169.
The absence of an "affirmative intention of the Congress
clearly expressed" fortifies our conclusion that Congress never
contemplated that church-operated schools would be required
to grant recognition to uuions as bargaining agents for its
teachers.
The Board relies heavily upon Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U . 8. 103 (1937). There the Court held that the First
Amendment was no bar to the applicatiou of the Act to the
Associated Press. an organiza.tion engaged in collecting information and news throughout the world and distributing it to
its members. Perceiving nothing to suggest that application
of the Act would infringe First Ameudment guarante<•s of
press freedoms, the C'ourt sustained Board jurisdiction. I d.,
at 131- 132. Here, on the contrary, the record affords ample
evidence that the Board 's exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools would implicate the guaranters
of the Religion Clauses.
Accordingly. iu the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intellt to bring teachers in church-operated schools
within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe
th<> Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to
r<>solvc difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the
guarantees of the First Amendmrnt .Religion Clauses.
Affirmed.
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APPENDIX
Q [By Hearing Officer]. Now. we havf' had quit<> a hit of
testimony already as to liturgies. and I don't want to b<'at a
dead horse; but let me ask you one question: If you know.
how many liturgies ar<> requit·ed at C'atholic parochial high
schools, do you know?
A. 1 thiuk our first problem with that would lw defining
liturgies. That word would have many definitions. Do you
want to go into that?
Q. I believe you defined it before. is that correct, when
you first testified'?
A. I am uot sure. Let me try briefly to do it again. okay?
Q. Yes.
A. A liturgy can rang<' anywhere from the strictest senseof the word, which is the sacrifice of the Mass in the Roman
Catholic terminology. It can go from that all th<> way down
to a very informal group in what we call shared prayer.
Two or thref' individuals praying together and reflecting
their own reactions to a scriptural reading. All of these-and
there is a big spectrum in between those two Pxtremes-all of
these are popularly refprrecl to as liturgies.
Q. T see.
A. Now, possibly in repeating your question you could
givC' me an idea of that spectrum, I could respond more
accurately.
Q. Well, let us stick with the formal Masses. Tf you
know, how many Masses arE' required at Catholic parochial
high schools?
A. Some havE' none, none required. Some would have
two or three during the year where what we call Holy Days
of Obligation coincide with school days. Some schools on
those days prefer to have a Mass within the school day so the·
stu <.len ts attend there, rather than thPir parish churches.
Some schools feel that is not a good idea; they would always·
be in their parish church; so that varies a great deal from
chool to sch00L

;§u:pumt <!Jllltrl of flrt ~h .§bUts
'Jltla.sJri:n.gLtn. ~. <!J. 2llbi'!-~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

January 18, 1979

No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago

Dear Chief:
I have problems with the first paragraph of Part
IV of your opinion, beginning on page nine and carrying
over onto page ten. My difficulties with this paragraph
are these:
1. It seems to me to be so self-evident as to
require no citation of authority that the Labor Board
cannot act in violation of the Constitution.
2.
I am bothered by the use of cases discussing
the extent of a power explicitly conferred upon Congress
(i.~., the commerce power) as analogies for considering
the impact of an explicit prohibition contained in the
Bill of Rights (i.~., the First Amendment).
3. The language you quote from the Reliance Fuel
opinion suggests that it is the Court's duty in the
present case to decide the constitutional issue.

I

If the paragraph in question were eliminated, I
would have no difficulty whatever in joining your opinion
for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

.;§np-unu Qf411trlllf f:1rt ~b .;§tatts
~llll fri:ngton. ~. <!f. 2!l.;tJI. ~
CHAMBERS OF

January 18, 1979

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, et al.

Dear Chief,
I shall await the dissent in this
case.
Sincerely yours,
I'

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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<!Jomt of tltt 2Jin.it.e~ ~hlftg
'J!tirlUlJrbtgftltt. lQ. <!J. 2112)!..;1

.;§up-rtntt

CHAMBERS OF

January 18, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

.
Re:

No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bi"'shop of Chicago

Dear Chief:
I, too, shall await the dissent in this case.

The Chief Justice •
cc :

\,.•(

\

The Conferenc e

~npr~nu

<qomt ~ t1tt ~~ ~tatt•

Jru-Jtinghtn. ~.<If.

21l?~~

/

CHAMBERS OF'

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 18, 1979

Re:

77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

BB

1/18/79

MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 77-752, 'LRB

t~

Ch~cago · Btshqp o~ · Chicaqo

The Chief Justice's opinion follows the line of
analysis suggested by Justice Stewart at Conference, and
tentatively approved by you.

If exercise of the claimed

jurisdiction by the Labor Board would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will not construe the labor
statute to create such jurisdiction unless Congress has clearly
expressed its intent to do so.

(Section IV of the opinion.)

Grave constitutional issues are raised by the proposed
assertion of jurisdiction.

(Section

v.)

There is no clear

expression of congressional intent to create such jurisdiction.
(Section VI.)
I think that you will want to join this opinion.
There are two points, however, that would be worth raising with
the Chief Justice.

The first paragraph of Section IV, at p. 9,

2.

one
distracts/trom the analysis.

In the cases cited and quoted

there, the Court was considering challenges to the Board's
jurisdiction based on claims that the business of a particular
employer did not affect interstate commerce.

As those cases

indicate, where the Commerce Clause limitation on congressional
authority is implicated, the Court does not shy away from the
constitutional question by seeking a construction of the
statute that avoids the problem.

Rather, it defines the scope

of the statutory jurisdiciton by determining the actual scope
of the commerce power.

The Court takes this approach because

the labor statute was enacted under the authority of the
Commerce Clause.

Accordingly, Congress must have had in mind

the limits on that authority, and would have expressed any
intent it might have had to exercise less than the full power.
The opinion in the present case is premised, however,
on the notion that with regard to constitutional limitations
other than the Commerce Clause, the Court does not need to
resolve the exact constitutional limits on Congress' power in
order to determine the reach of the statute.

Instead, as IAM

v. Street (First Amendment) and McCulloch (separation of
powers) indicate (see pp. 10-11 of the opinion), near these
other

constitutional boundaries on congressional power the

Court will determine first whether Congress expressly extended
the reach of the statute into the area of possible
constitutional difficulty.

This approach is based on the idea

3•

..

that when it enacted the labor statute, Congress did not
consider all of the possible constitutional problems that might
arise, and should not be presumed to have enacted a statute
that would create such problems.

The Chief Justice's opinion

does not note or explain the different approach taken to
Commerce Clause and to other constitutional limitations on the
reach of the labor statute.

Without such an explanation, it is

difficult to square the first paragraph of Section IV with the ~
remainder of the opinion. Further, nothing would be lost by
--------------'-----~----simply deleting that paragraph.

~

The Appendix reproduces testimony from the
jurisdictional hearing regarding the

~ley _; cho sls

rather

than from an unfair labor practice proceeding as implied at
opinion, pp. 12-13 & n. 10.
...

....._

The opinion of theCA 7 in this

case contains references to several unfair labor practice
proceedings that illustrate the intrusive nature of Board
jurisdiction.

See Petition for Certiorari, at 33a-35a.

The other point at which the dissent will probably
attack this opinion is its treatment of Associated · Press · v;
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).

Seep. 17 of the opinion.

But I

think that the Chief Justice has done as much with that case as
he could do consistently with the approach adopted here.

There

was nothing in that case to suggest constitutional difficulties
with Board jurisdiction over editorial writers at the AP; here,
it seems likely that substantial constitutional problems will

arise from Board jurisdiction.

~~

January 19, 1979

CHAMB E RS OF"

.JUSTICE

w ...

..J . BRENNAN , .JR.

RE:

No. 77-752

N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago

Dear Chief:
In due course I shall circulate a dissent

in the

above.
Sincerely,

~
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference

-.

.§u:puuu <!feud of tltt 1Jtnittb .§taftg
'Baglrhtgton, ~. <!f. 20,?J!.c1
C HAMBE RS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

January 19, 1979

Re:

No. 77-752 - N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago

Dear Chief:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

~T.M.

The Chief Justice
cc:

"

. '.lri

The Conference

,·

Dear
~ I agree with Potter that the first paragraph of
Part IV of your opinion probably detracts from the otherwise consistent flow of your analysis.
,:t

Otherwise, I think you have written a fine opinion
and, with the removal
paragraph mentioned, will be
glad to join you.

''

1

,,

'

··' ..

~ttpt'ttnt Ofourl of tlrt 'Jttiltb ;%taftg
.aslp:n:ghtn. ~. Qf. 2llbf~~
CHAMI!IERS 01'"

January 22, 1979

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop

Dear Potter:
I agree I do not need the material beginning with the
second sentence under Part IV and going to the bottom of
that page.
I am deleting it. However, I am not deleting
the first sentence under Part IV. Your suggestion that we
omit that which is "so self evident as to require no
citation of authority" is a revolutionary one! Applied
universally, it would cut down our writing vastly (which
might be good). As it stands, it introduces the subject
of Part IV.
As is usual, there are a number of other stylistic
changes, none of which go to substance. A new draft is at
the printer.

~ds,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

•'
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1/24/79

MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 77-752, NLRB v Catholic Bishop of Chicaqo
The Chief Justice has retained the first, the

penultimate, and the final sentences of the first paragraph in
Section IV of the first draft of his opinion.

The resulting

paragraph is confusing -- the first sentence remarks
constitutional limits on the Board's actions, the second, one
of the constitutional limits on congressional power.

And the

paragraph does nothing more than state the obvious.
The Chief Justice has eliminated from the paragraph
the troublesome references to NLRB v. Fainblatt and NLRB v.
Reliance Fuel Corp.

The dissent will tax him, no doubt, for

failing to explain how those two cases and others like them
square with the cases cited and relied upon at pp.10-11.

See

my previous memorandum concerning the Chief Justice's first
draft.

But at least with the removal of the references to

2.

Fainblatt and _;;;..;;:..:::..:..:...:::~~:__!_,
Rel'1ance Fuel the Chief Just·
,
no longer raises this
lee s opinion itself
unanswered question.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 29, 1979

Re:

No. 77-752- NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago ·

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

•

.·

~u:puntt ~llltrlcf tire 'J!tnit.dt ~taJrg
';Was fri:nghm.;!D. ~ 2ll.;tJI. ~
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

/

February 8, 1979

Re:

No. 77-752, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago

Dear Chief,
This is to confirm that I join your op1n1on in
the above case as recirculated on January 23, 1979.
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

~uprtmt

Qf01trl l1f tqt ~ttitdt ~hUts

'J.!ragqmgttm. ~. <!}.
CHAMBERS OF

March 1, 1979

.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

Re:

2llbiJ!.~

No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago, et al.

Dear Bill,
Please join me in your dissent
in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
erne

;§uprtmt

<Q'LtU.rl of tilt ~ni:f.t~ ..§taf.tg

'Jlttaslrntgton. ~·

<!f. zog;Jl.;l

CHAMBERS OF

March 2, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

..

Re:

No. 77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi'cago

Dear Bill :
Please join me in your dissenting opinion.
, Sincerely,

Mr. Ju s ti c e B r nna n
cc :

The Confe r e nee

.iuprtnu QfDttd ltf tltt ~b .itafts
11htslfinghm. ~. <!f. 21l,?.ll-~

/

CHAMe£RS 0,.

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March

Re:

s,

77-752 - NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

T.M.

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc;

1979

The Conference
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